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THE FORGOTTEN RIGHT OF FAIR USE
Ned Snow †
ABSTRACT
Free speech was once an integral part of copyright law; today it is
all but forgotten. At common law, principles of free speech protected
those who expressed themselves by using another’s expression. Free
speech determined whether speakers had infringed a copyright. To
prevail on a copyright claim, then, a copyright holder would need to
prove that the speaker’s use fell outside the scope of permissible
speech—or in other words, that the use was not fair. Where
uncertainty prevented that proof, fair use would protect speakers
from the suppression of copyright. Today, however, all this has
changed. Copyright has deeply buried any remnants of free speech,
redefining the doctrine of fair use as a pretext for piracy that aims to
excuse infringing conduct. Copyright enforcement has become the
norm and fair use the exception, resulting in a presumption against
fair-use speech. Uncertainty no longer protects speakers; it damns
them. The change—from fair use as a strong right of speech to fair
use as a weak excuse—occurred subtly, unintentionally, and without
reason. It was a mistake. Quickly becoming widespread, the mistake
swiftly eroded speech protections in copyright. If left unchecked, the
mistake will become immutable. This Article traces the history of fair
use from its birth as a strong right of speech to its deterioration into a
weak excuse for infringement.

† Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author
expresses appreciation to professors Mark Lemley, Rebecca Tushnet, Mark Killenbeck, Michael
Mullane, Joseph Liu, Gideon Parchomovsky, Thomas Lee, Stephen Sheppard, and Lawrence
Solum for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. The author also
acknowledges the insightful comments provided by participants of the 2008 Works in Progress
Intellectual Property Colloquium.
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INTRODUCTION
For over a century, property rights of copyright holders were
subject to speech rights of those who expressed themselves by
repeating another’s expression.1 Through the doctrine of fair use, free
speech offered presumptive protection to users of copyrighted
material: copyright holders had to prove that a use was unfair to
prevail on a claim of infringement. 2 Today, speech rights of fair users
are subject to property rights of copyright holders. Fair use stands as
See infra Part II.A (analyzing the history of fair use).
See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 13 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (holding for defendant
accused of copyright infringement on grounds that copyright holder, “on whom the burden of
proof lies,” had failed to show that defendant’s use of copyrighted material amounted to
infringement).
1
2
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an exception to a copyright norm, available only in extraordinary
circumstances: 3 copyright holders prevail unless fair users can prove
that their use merits protection.4 Thus, free speech once defined the
scope of copyright; today, copyright defines the scope of free speech.
This change in fair use, from a right of speech to an excuse for
infringement, occurred subtly in the path of law. There was no clear
and distinct alteration in course; there was no deliberate or intentional
decision made. 5 It was unintentional and accidental. Courts simply
made a mistake. The speech-protective features of fair use are today
all but forgotten as courts now view fair use as an exception to the
norm of copyright monopoly. Simply put, where there is doubt as to
whether a use is fair—which is always—courts refuse to apply fair
use, for they view it as a doctrine that is exceptional, and its
exceptionality suggests that circumstances requiring its application
must be clear and apparent before it can be invoked. 6 As a result,
copyright’s interest in suppressing expression has ascended over free
speech’s interest in building upon expression. Monopolies are
prevailing. Speech is suffering.
This Article traces the history of fair use from a speech right that
defined the contours of copyright to an exception that excuses
infringement. Part I outlines the doctrine of fair use and its role in
alleviating the inherent tension between protecting free speech and
creating incentives for original expression. Part I also explains the
role of the conceptual and procedural framework for applying fair
use. Part II recites the relevant history of fair use. It analyzes judicial
treatment of fair use from its inception to its present application,
pointing out the shift from viewing fair use as a right that defined
copyright to an affirmative defense that excused infringement. Part II
further recounts indications of congressional intent to make fair use a
right; it then points out the Court’s faulty interpretation of those
indications. Part III examines courts’ present treatment of fair use,
analyzing specific cases that illustrate the substantive effect of
changing the framework of fair use from a right to an excuse.

3 See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal
citations omitted) (“The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative
defense.”); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Colo.
2006) (refusing to recognize fair use based on fact that author never would have consented to
use).
4 See infra Part II.A–B (showing evolution of fair use from right to excuse).
5 See infra Part II.B (discussing courts’ departure from precedent that treated fair use as a
right).
6 See infra Part III (discussing present treatment of fair use).
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I. THE ROLE OF FAIR USE
A. A Fundamental Conflict
At war are free speech and copyright. The principle of free speech
represents a limitation on the government’s ability to restrain
expression. 7 Copyright represents a government restraint on the
public’s ability to communicate copied expression: it restrains those
who speak expression already articulated by another.8 Copyright
condones that restraint; free speech condemns it.
From the inception of fair use, the purpose of the fair-use doctrine
has been to alleviate the tension between copyright and free speech.9
Simply put, its ostensible purpose is to reconcile the respective
speech-suppressive and speech-protective positions. It is intended to
exempt from copyright that which merits protection as speech.10 If
subsequent expression incorporates another’s prior expression in
order to communicate an original idea, that subsequent expression
constitutes a fair use of the prior expression, and so the law should
protect it as speech.11 Fair use, then, is intended to calm the strife
between copyright and free speech by delineating core speech that
copyright cannot suppress. 12
Over time, courts developed general principles to determine
whether a use of copyrighted expression was permissibly fair.13
Today, the Copyright Act states some of those principles in a list of
four factors that courts must consider in determining fairness.14 The
first factor examines whether the use is transformative and whether
the use serves a commercial purpose; the second factor examines
whether the nature of the copyrighted work merits strong protection;
the third factor examines whether the use constitutes a significant
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
8 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 504 (2006) (endowing copyright holders with
exclusive rights over original expression and imposing penalties on persons who violate those
rights).
9 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (recognizing fair use as an exception to copyright
infringement); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 n.24 (2003) (describing fair use as a
free speech safeguard and a First Amendment accommodation); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
344, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (articulating principles of fair use).
10 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20 (discussing copyright law’s “built-in First Amendment
accommodations”).
11 See id. at 220 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (“The fair use defense affords
considerable latitude for scholarship and comment . . . and even for parody . . . .”).
12 See infra Part II.B (discussing fair use as an affirmative defense).
13 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3–26 (2d ed.
1995) (tracing the history of fair use).
14 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (2006); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 577 (1994) (applying the fair-use factors).
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amount or a substantial portion of the copyrighted work; and the
fourth factor examines whether the use significantly affects the value
of, or a potential market for, the copyrighted work. 15
The application of these factors to circumstances often raises
difficulty for decision makers. 16 Consider the first-factor inquiry into
whether a use transforms a copyrighted work. Does a trivia game
about the popular television show, Seinfeld, transform the expression
in that show? 17 Does a painting of a copyrighted photograph
transform that photograph—e.g., Shepard Fairey’s painting of the
Associated Press photograph of President Obama? 18 Transformation,
which is a question of degree and which often weighs heavily in a
court’s fair-use analysis, may be too far buried in grey for a court to
discern its presence with absolute clarity. Determining fairness
requires a fact-finder to draw upon subjective experience and opinion,
which makes predicting the outcome exceedingly difficult. 19
Of course not every assertion of fair use raises uncertainty. Some
infringers may assert the argument where it is not even arguable.20 In
such cases of blatant infringement, courts can easily dismiss bad-faith
arguments of fair use. 21 But for those cases where fair use is at least
arguable, courts and scholars alike recognize the inherent uncertainty
surrounding the question. 22
17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4).
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07
(1990) (“Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. . . . Decisions are not
governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual
fact patterns.”).
17 See Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (discussing that situation and concluding that the defendant trivia producer’s use of
Seinfeld was not a fair use), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998).
18 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 11, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 1:09–
CV–01123–AKH (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009), ECF No. 1 (arguing that Fairey’s painting was
transformative).
19 See Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on
Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 497–501 (2010) (“Because fair use is a
flexible doctrine, lacking a precise definition, it is an inherently vague and indeterminate
doctrine.”).
20 See id. (“[T]he indeterminacy of fair use requires that the judge or juror who draws the
fair use inferences inject her own view of what should be considered fair.”).
21 See id. at 498–99 n.90 (discussing a situation in which the defendant makes a
commercial use of a copied expression, which does not require any inferences).
22 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (requiring fair
use determinations to be made on a “case-by-case” basis); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104
F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole
law of copyright.”); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)
(Story, J.) (describing application of fair use as “the metaphysics of the law”); Michael J.
Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (“The substantive emptiness of fair use makes it something of a dumping
ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t manage in other areas.”); Gideon Parchomovsky
& Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (2007) (“[S]cholars
15
16
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The reason for the uncertainty that surrounds questions of fair use
is that the doctrine is intended to contemplate all circumstances that
could possibly justify protecting a use from copyright’s suppression. 23
Fair use must be as flexible as circumstances are variant that would
occasion its application. It is for this reason that fair use requires a
case-by-case analysis. 24 Flexibility yields uncertainty in meaning,
including the terms intended to offer clarity, e.g., transformation,
substantial, commercial, and potential market. Uncertainty, then, is
unavoidable—indeed, even intentional—in the doctrine of fair use,
for uncertainty allows flexibility and a breadth of application.
B. A Dispositive Framework
Amidst uncertainty, presumption becomes dispositive. In the
absence of clarity on a substantive question, a decision maker will
favor the litigant whom the law presumes to be the winner. 25 So the
uncertainty that accompanies fair-use questions increases the
importance of the presumption that governs. 26 The presumption turns
on the substantive view of fair use: fair use may be viewed as either a
speech right that is superior to the copyright right or as an exception
that excuses infringing conduct.27 The former conception implies a
presumption favoring fairness: as a right of speech, fair use would
require that a copyright holder prove that the speech is not protected,
i.e., that fair use should not apply. By contrast, the latter conception
implies a presumption favoring copyright: as an excuse for

generally agree that it is now virtually impossible to predict the outcome of fair use cases.”); R.
Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 423, 426 (2005) (“[T]here is little more that can be usefully said about the division
between fair and unfair uses in practice: The ‘know it when you see it’ nature of the analytic
approach in this context simply precludes such observations.”).
23 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (internal citation and quotations omitted) (“The fair use
doctrine . . . permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when,
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”).
24 See id. (citation omitted) (“[T]he statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for caseby-case analysis.”).
25 See e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (“On
balance, we think the fourth factor is a very close question. . . . [C]onsidering that [the user]
bears the burden of showing an absence of ‘usurpation’ harm to [the party holding the
copyright], believe that it tips toward [the party holding the copyright].”).
26 This conclusion turns on the premise that issues of fair use are factual and subject to
burden-of-proof presumptions. See Snow, supra note 19, at 497–506 (concluding that fair-use
issues must be treated as factual).
27 Compare Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir.
2001) (noting in dicta that “fair use should be considered an affirmative right” but declining to
treat it that way given a Supreme Court declaration that it is an affirmative defense), with
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[F]air use
excuses otherwise actionable infringement.”).
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infringement, fair use would be an exception that justifies infringing
conduct, i.e., the proponent must prove that it does apply. The
substantive view of fair use—as a right of speech or as an exceptional
excuse—determines the presumption. And that presumption provides
a significant substantive advantage to whichever party it favors.
For over a century, the framework for viewing the role of fair use
remained constant. 28 Fair use represented those principles for
identifying speech that copyright could not suppress. In effect, it
represented the superior right of speech over the inferior right of
copyright. Accordingly, a burden to prove unfair use rested with
copyright holders to prevail on a claim for infringement.29 In recent
years, however, the framework has shifted. Fair use now represents an
excuse to justify infringement, or in other words, an exception to the
norm of speech suppression through copyright.30 And as an exception
to copyright, fair use does not apply unless demonstrated. Fair users
must now prove that their use is fair before the law will protect them
from copyright.
An irony of this shift in the fair-use framework is that the
uncertainty that originally strengthened the speech-protective function
of fair use now weakens it. Under the framework of a right of speech,
fair use drew upon uncertainty to be flexible and broad; uncertainty
impeded copyright’s rush to suppress expression. Courts were
reluctant to enjoin a person from repeating expression if they were
uncertain whether the repetition constituted a fair or unfair use.31
Now, however, the framework of treating fair use as an exception to
the norm of copyright has turned the role of uncertainty in fair use
entirely upside down. Under the present framework, circumstances of
fairness must be apparent and obvious for the doctrine to apply, so
infringement is not excused where ambiguity and uncertainty exist. 32
Where a fair-use argument creates more questions than answers, it
must fail. Thus, the shift in the fair-use framework has changed the
role of uncertainty from protecting fair users to punishing them.

II. THE HISTORY OF FAIR USE: FROM RIGHT TO EXCUSE
From its inception, courts treated the fair-use doctrine as a right of
speech, but modern courts have departed from this position. And
despite Congress’s attempt to return the doctrine to its original status,
28
29
30
31
32

See infra Part II (discussing history of fair use).
See infra Part II (analyzing burdens of proof in fair use).
See infra Part III (interpreting modern day treatment of fair use).
See infra Part II (comparing courts’ prior treatment of fair use).
See infra Part III (explaining the modern day approach to fair use).
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the Supreme Court ultimately settled the issue against fair users. This
Part recounts this history.
A. Judicial Treatment of Fair Use as a Right
1. English Case Law
Early fair-use jurisprudence recognized that fair use was a right
that competed with the claim of copyright. Before fair use was
introduced in the United States, English common law contemplated
the doctrine. 33 Those early English cases described principles of fair
use as defining infringement, or in other words, they describe those
principles as defining the scope of the copyright holder’s rights. By
defining the scope of the copyright holder’s rights, fair use
represented that which was outside the scope of rights held by the
copyright holder.
Examples are apparent of early English courts treating fair use in
this manner.34 In Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 35 the defendant-user had
printed one-tenth of Samuel Johnson’s fictional work, The Prince of
Abyssinia. 36 The court contemplated whether this use constituted a
fair abridgment:
I shall determine this case upon the next question, which is,
Whether there has been any infringement of property? . . . It
was insisted for the defendant, that what was printed in the
Magazine was a fair abridgment, and, as such, not a piracy.
No certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgment;
but every case must depend on its own circumstances.37
33 See PATRY, supra note 13, at 3–26 (tracing the English common law roots of the
modern fair-use doctrine).
34 The first recorded decision that articulates principles of fair use arose in Gyles v.
Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (Ch.). There, the defendant used portions of the copyright
holder’s work to create a legal treatise. Id. In contemplating the copyright holder’s plea for an
injunction, the court described abridgements:
Where books are colourably shortened only, they are undoubtedly within the meaning of
the act of Parliament, and are a mere evasion of the statute, and cannot be called an abridgment.
But this must not be carried so far as to restrain persons from making a real and fair abridgment,
for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper and
print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them, and in many
cases are extremely useful, though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the
sense of an author.
Id. at 490. Recognizing that a fair abridgement might be prejudicial against the original
author, the court suggested that the fair abridgment would not lie “within the meaning of the act
of Parliament,” implying that the court viewed the fair abridgment as lying outside the scope of
copyright. Id.
35 (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.).
36 Id. at 270–71.
37 Id. at 271.
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Defining infringement in terms of whether the use constituted a fair
abridgment, the court held that the defendant’s use was fair.38
In Cary v. Kearsley, 39 the defendant-user had employed the
copyright holder’s book of maps to create his own. 40 Contemplating
whether the user had committed a piracy, the court stated:
That part of the work of one author is found in another, is not
of itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man may
fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use
of another’s labours for the promotion of science, and the
benefit of the public: but having done so, the question will be,
Was the matter so taken used fairly with that view, and
without what I may term animus furandi? 41
This explanation demonstrates that the court viewed the issue of
whether the user had fairly used the copyright holder’s material as
dispositive to the question of infringement. Specifically, that issue
determined whether the user had committed a piracy, or in other
words, whether the facts supported an action.42 After this explanation,
the copyright holder wisely dismissed his action voluntarily. 43
Early English case law thus treated fair-use principles as
determinative of whether infringement had occurred, which meant
that fair use defined the scope of the copyright holder’s rights. 44 A
result of this treatment was that uncertainty surrounding whether a
use was fair favored the defendant-user. Because a copyright holder
bore the burden to demonstrate infringement, the copyright holder
was required to show that the defendant’s use was unfair. So if a court
could not determine whether a use was fair or unfair, the court would
rule that the copyright holder had not fulfilled his burden to show
infringement. In short, doubt as to whether the use was fair would
result in the court allowing the use. An example of this occurs in
Murray v. Bogue. 45 There, the defendant-user had published travelers’
guides based on the copyright holder’s copyrighted work. 46 In

Id. at 272.
(1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.).
40 Id. at 679–80.
41 Id. at 680.
42 See id. (“That part of the work of one author is found in another, is not itself piracy, or
sufficient to support an action.”).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163, 165 (Ch.) (“The question upon the
whole is, whether this is a legitimate use of the Plaintiff’s publication in the fair exercise of a
mental operation, deserving the character of an original work.”).
45 (1852) 61 Eng. Rep. 487 (Ch.).
46 Id. at 493.
38
39
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refusing the copyright holder’s bill for an injunction, the court
commented:
I have felt great difficulty in coming to a conclusion whether .
. . the use of the Plaintiff’s materials and the benefit derived
from his work by the Defendant, direct or indirectly, amount
to such an extraction from it as comes up to an extraction of
the vital part; whether it comes up to an unfair use, or is only
a fair use of it. . . . On the whole, my conclusion is that I
cannot say that the Defendant in his work makes an unfair use
of the Plaintiff’s. I am not absolutely satisfied that the use
made of it might not by another Judge be looked at in a
different light; but I cannot satisfy my mind that there is that
unfair use which would justify me in restraining the
publication of the Defendant’s work. 47
Repeatedly portraying the ultimate issue as whether the defendantuser made an unfair use, the Murray court here expressed its
uncertainty on whether it should conclude that the use was fair or
unfair. The court further admitted the possibility that a different judge
might believe the use to be unfair, but this judge could not satisfy his
mind that there had been an unfair use.48 Uncertainty, then, compelled
the court to rule for the user. 49
2. Federal Case Law
Principles of fair use developed in the United States based on the
English common law. Like their English counterparts, courts in the
U.S. treated the principles of fair use as definitional to the issue of
infringement: fair-use principles determined whether a copyright
holder’s rights had been invaded, or in other words, they determined
the scope of a copyright holder’s rights. 50 As definitional to
infringement, fair use implied that the user held a presumptive right to
use the copyrighted expression absent a showing otherwise. 51 The
subsections below describe this treatment.

Id. (second emphasis added).
See id. (“I am not absolutely satisfied that the use made of [plaintiff’s work] might not
by another Judge be looked at in a different light.”).
49 See id. (holding that the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s work was not unfair).
50 See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing early American courts’ use of fair-use principles as
determinative of infringement).
51 See infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing early American courts’ presumption of a general
privilege held by subsequent users to make use of a work, and copyright limiting that right).
47
48
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a) Fair Use as a Test for Infringement
Archetypal fair-use law well establishes that courts treated
principles of fair use as determining the issue of infringement. The
first American case to articulate the principles of fair use, Folsom v.
Marsh, 52 exemplifies this treatment. 53 There, Justice Joseph Story
considered whether a defendant-user had infringed the copyright
holder’s rights in letters from President George Washington when the
user employed them in a historical work. 54 While analyzing whether
the user had infringed the copyright holder’s work, Justice Story
articulated principles that today constitute the four statutory factors of
fair use. 55
In articulating these principles, it is clear that Justice Story treated
them as determining infringement. He framed the “question of
piracy” regarding “what constitutes an infringement” as depending
on, among other things, “a nice balance of the comparative use made
in one of the materials of the other; [and] the nature, extent, and value
of the materials thus used,” 56 citing a critical review as an example of
a permissible use. 57 Later in the opinion, Justice Story succinctly
stated the question that the facts presented as follows: “The question,
then, is, whether this is a justifiable use of the original materials, such
as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the
plaintiffs.” 58 To answer that question, he explained:
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 431–
32 (1998) (arguing that a misunderstanding of Folsom v. Marsh is that it “created fair use, when
in fact it merely redefined infringement”).
54 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345 (describing “more than one third” of defendant-user’s
work as containing the letters of George Washington).
55 See id. at 344, 348 (“[T]he question of piracy, often depend[s] upon a nice balance of
the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other. . . . In short, we must often, in
deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”); see also Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (crediting Justice Story’s articulation of fair
use as the basis for the modern doctrine as codified in the 1976 Copyright Act).
56 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344. This quotation reflects the Copyright Act’s articulation of fair
use: the Act cites criticism as an example of fair use; the first factor balances the comparative
uses by examining the purpose of the use; the second factor examines the nature of the
copyrighted work; and the third examines the extent of the work that was used. See 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2006) (setting forth the statutory factors of a fair-use defense).
57 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344 (“[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite
largely from the original work . . . for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism.”). As an
opposing example, he cited a review that quoted from an original work simply to substitute for
the work, reflecting the first fair-use factor’s examination of the purpose and character of the
use. Compare id. at 344–45 (citing a review that quotes from an original work simply to
substitute or supersede the original work), with 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (examining the purpose and
character of the use).
58 Folsom, 9 F. Cas at 348.
52
53

11/15/2011 4:54:22 PM

146

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work. 59
For Justice Story, then, determining whether the law would
recognize the use as infringing turns on inquiries that today constitute
the doctrine of fair use—here, specifically, the amount and
substantiality of the amount taken and the market impact. Throughout
Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story set forth principles that guide today’s
fair-use doctrine as inquiries that determine infringement. 60
Justice Story’s portrayal of fair-use principles as determining
infringement is not limited to Folsom v. Marsh. In Gray v. Russell, 61
he articulated the same principles, framing the ultimate question that
those principles determined as: “what amounts to a piracy of a
work?” 62 Examples of uses that turned this piracy inquiry into “a very
nice question,” Justice Story explained, included copying another’s
expression for purposes of writing a critical review or creating an
abridgement. 63 These examples required “various considerations,”
Id. at 348.
Further language from Folsom demonstrates Justice Story treating principles of fair use
as determinative of infringements:
59
60

If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors
of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another,
that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. . . . In some cases, a
considerable portion of the materials of the original work may be fused, if I may use
such an expression, into another work, so as to be undistinguishable in the mass of
the latter, which has other professed and obvious objects, and cannot fairly be
treated as a piracy; or they may be inserted as a sort of distinct and mosaic work,
into the general texture of the second work, and constitute the peculiar excellence
thereof, and then it may be a clear piracy.
Id. (emphases added).
61 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
62 Id. at 1038. Justice Story articulated the principles in Gray v. Russell as follows:
In some cases, indeed, it may be a very nice question, what amounts to a piracy of a
work, or not. Thus, if large extracts are made therefrom in a review, it might be a
question, whether those extracts were designed bonâ fide for the mere purpose of
criticism, or were designed to supersede the original work under the pretence of a
review, by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in
relation to an abridgment of an original work. The question, in such a case, must be
compounded of various considerations; whether it be a bonâ fide abridgment, or only
an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts; whether it will, in its present
form, prejudice or supersede the original work; whether it will be adapted to the
same class of readers; and many other considerations of the same sort, which may
enter as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been a piracy, or not.
Id.
63

Id.
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such as whether the use superseded the original work, was adapted to
the same set of readers, omitted only unimportant parts—all of which
“may enter as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been a
piracy, or not.” 64 Thus, according to Justice Story, principles of fair
use constituted “elements” of the copyright holder’s claim. 65
Also noteworthy about Justice Story’s explanations is that he never
identified the principles of fair use as a doctrine distinct from the
infringement inquiry. Never once did he even employ the term fair
use. Not until decades later did the term “fair use” develop as a
descriptor of the principles that Story had set forth. 66 For Story, then,
the principles of fair use did not represent a doctrine independent
from the question of infringement that would merit a distinct label;
those principles were part and parcel with the criteria for determining
infringement.
This view is further exemplified in Story’s treatise on equity
jurisprudence, where he explained: “If there has been [a legitimate
use of the copyright], although it may be prejudicial to the original
author, it is not an invasion of his legal rights.” 67 Determining
whether a use is legitimate, then, determines whether a copyright
holder’s rights have been invaded. To be sure, Story viewed a fair use
as a use not contemplated by the legal rights of the copyright holder.
According to Story, then, principles of fair use delineated the
contours of infringement; they determined whether a user had invaded
the copyright holder’s right. Those principles did not simply excuse
infringing conduct; they were not like the defenses of consent,
expired limitations, or necessity in that they did not represent an
exception to copyright. Rather, the principles represented the basis for
determining the scope of copyright. 68 Story viewed the principles of
fair use not as subject to the right of copyright, but rather as
definitional to the right of copyright. 69
Id.
See id. (stating that considerations parallel to those of the fair-use doctrine “may enter
as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been a piracy”).
66 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (using the
term “fair use”).
67 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 1269, at 617–18 (14th ed. 1918).
68 Were fair use like the affirmative defenses listed above, then the principles of fair use
articulated in Folsom would have been mere dicta to Justice Story’s holding, for he found that
the defendant had infringed. Yet most assuredly the principles of fair use in Folsom are not
dicta: they represent the principles under which he found infringement. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F. Cas. 342, 348–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (relying on principles akin to the fair-use
doctrine in finding that defendant-user infringed on plaintiff’s copyright).
69 See, e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)
(Story, J.) (emphasis added) (“[T]o amount to an infringement, it is not necessary that there
should be a complete copy or imitation in use throughout; but only that there should be an
64
65
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Like Justice Story, the other early American jurists that articulated
the fair-use doctrine treated it as definitional to infringement. 70 For
instance, in Story v. Holcombe, 71 the court described the inquiry into
“[t]he infringement of a copyright” as a qualitative assessment into
the user’s copying, with the ultimate question turning on whether the
use has superseded the original work. 72 Quoting Justice Story, the
court repeated the view that “a fair and bona fide abridgment of an
original work, is not a piracy of the copyright of the author.”73 The
court therefore viewed fair abridgments as lying outside the scope of
uses granted to the author in copyright. Interestingly, the court noted
that it would have preferred that the common law had adopted a
stricter doctrine of infringement rather than the liberal doctrine stated
in fair use, yet the court nevertheless applied those fair-use principles,
thereby indicating the strength of those principles in relation to
copyright: they apparently were not applied at the mere discretion of

important and valuable portion which operates injuriously to the copy-right of the plaintiff.”).
70 See, e.g., Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 35 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) (relying on Folsom to
describe the question of fair use as: “[T]o what is the artist or author entitled as his conception,
and what of such original conception has been appropriated?”); Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494,
496 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (“It is not only quantity, but value and quality, that are to be
regarded in determining the question of piracy.”); Chapman v. Ferry, 18 F. 539, 541 (C.C.D. Or.
1883) (relying on Folsom for the proposition that “[q]uestions of infringement of copyright are
often very difficult to decide.”); Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 60 (summarizing principles of fair use
in Folsom as determining what “constitute[s] an invasion of copyright”); Greene v. Bishop, 10
F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763) (“Great difficulties oftentimes surround the
inquiry, whether an alleged act of copying from an original author amounts to piracy, or whether
it may or may not be justified on the ground of fair quotation, or that the use made of the book
or its contents does not exceed what the law permits to another engaged in composing a new
work upon the same subject.”).
71 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
72 Id. at 173 (“[T]his privilege can not be so exercised as to supersede the original book.”).
That the court viewed principles of fair use as determinative of infringement, rather than as an
excuse for infringement, is apparent from the following:
[T]he special master comes to the conclusion that there is no infringement; but that
the work of Holcombe is a fair abridgment . . . . The infringement of a copyright
does not depend so much upon the length of the extracts as upon their value. If they
embody the spirit and the force of the work in a few pages, they take from it that in
which its chief value consists. This may be done to a reasonable extent by a
reviewer, whose object is to show the merit or demerit of the work. But this privilege
can not be so exercised as to supersede the original book. . . . The inquiry is, what
effect must the extracts have upon the original work. If they render it less valuable
by superseding its use, in any degree, the right of the author is infringed: and it can
be of no importance to know with what intent this was done.
Id. at 172–73.
73 Id. at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
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the court; rather, the principles of fair use represented the defining
line of copyright that the law required courts to apply. 74
b) Fair Use as a Right
Consistent with the view that infringement requires unfair use is
the view that use of another’s expression constitutes the norm and
suppression of that use through copyright constitutes the exception.
The eminent case of Lawrence v. Dana 75 is illustrative. In Lawrence,
the copyright holder had published a legal treatise that included
extensive annotations; the user-defendant later published an edition of
the same work in which he allegedly copied these annotations. 76 The
court held that the use was not fair, explaining fair use as a more
general privilege of the user:
None of these rules of [copyright] decision are inconsistent
with the privilege of a subsequent writer to make what is
called a fair use of a prior publication; but their effect
undoubtedly is, to limit that privilege so that it shall not be
exercised to an extent to work substantial injury to the
property which is under the legal protection of copyright.77
The Lawrence court thus viewed subsequent authors as holding a
privilege to exercise fair use and copyright holders as limiting that
privilege. 78 Privilege here means an immunity that the law grants to a
specific class of persons, namely, to creators of expression. 79 Merely
by being an author does a person enjoy a general privilege that
exempts her from legal liability for her writings—so the court
taught. 80 This privilege, the court pointed out, is not absolute:
copyright limits the privilege where the subsequent expression
supersedes the original author’s work, substantially injuring the

74 See id. (“[I]n this country the [fair-use] doctrine has prevailed. I am, therefore, bound
by precedent; and I yield to it in this instance, more as a principle of law, than a rule of reason or
justice.”).
75 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
76 Id. at 31–32.
77 Id. at 61.
78 See id. (discussing the interplay between fair use and infringement).
79 See id. (“[C]ases frequently arise in which, though there is some injury, yet equity will
not interpose by injunction to prevent the further use . . . .”); see also generally THOMAS
WALTER WILLIAMS, A COMPENDIOUS AND COMPREHENSIVE LAW DICTIONARY (1816)
(unpaginated) (defining privilege to be “either personal or real,” with a “personal privilege”
meaning “that which is granted to any person, either against or beyond the course of the
common law: as, for example, a member of parliament may not be arrested”).
80 See Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 61 (speaking generally about the “privilege of a subsequent
writer to make what is called a fair use of a prior publication”).
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original author. 81 Stated another way, copyright limits the general
privilege to its core—fair use. Key is that copyright limits the
privilege, rather than the privilege limiting copyright. According to
Lawrence, then, fair use does not exist as an exception to copyright,
but rather, copyright exists as an exception to fair use.
An early copyright treatise further indicates this relationship
between copyright and fair use. In his influential copyright treatise,
George Ticknor Curtis expressly labeled fair use as a “right.” 82 Curtis
explained that in view of the right of fair use, the inquiry into
copyright infringement must first
assum[e] the general principle, that every writer is at liberty
to treat of any subject whatever, whether it has been
previously written upon by others or not; and then [that
inquiry] resolves itself into the question . . . whether he has
made a lawful use of the particular work which he is alleged
to have infringed. 83
This excerpt suggests that Curtis viewed the general right of speech in
every author as foundational to the inquiry into whether a user had
infringed copyright. The general right constitutes the norm. Only after
recognizing that general right does the inquiry turn to whether the
speech by the subsequent author is unlawful, or in other words,
whether the use infringes copyright. According to Curtis, then, the
right of authors to create and speak is the norm and copyright’s
suppression of that right is the limitation, or exception, to that right.
c) Fair Use as a Presumption
Viewing copyright as an exception to a subsequent author’s
general right to speak suggests a presumption in favor of fair use. If
the norm is speech and the exception is suppression, then it would
seem that the proponent of the exception, copyright holders, must
81 See id. (“[T]he privilege of fair use accorded to a subsequent writer must be such, and
such only, as will not cause substantial injury to the proprietor of the first publication.”).
82 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 237 (1847). Mr.
Curtis stated:

To administer the law in such a manner as not to curtail the fair use of existing
materials, in any department of letters, is one of the great tasks of jurisprudence. It
proposes to itself, first, the vindication of rights acquired by genius, discovery,
invention, and labor, in the productions of the mind; secondly, the acknowledgment
upon motives of public policy, of the right to a fair use by any writer of all that has
been recorded by previous authors.
Id.
83

Id. at 254.
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prove that the exception applies; otherwise the use is presumptively
fair. Stated differently, as a test for infringement, the principles of fair
use require the litigant bearing the burden to prove infringement—the
copyright holder—to incorporate those principles in satisfying that
burden. The early view of fair use, then, suggests a presumption of
fair use, and this would have required copyright holders to prove that
the use was not fair, or in other words, that the use was unfair. 84
On this point, Lawrence v. Dana is again instructive.85 The
Lawrence court explained the issue of determining “an invasion of
copyright” (or in other words, determining infringement) by reciting
Justice Story’s articulation of the fair-use doctrine. 86 Stating this same
issue of infringement “in brief terms,” the court formulated it as
follows: “was that use allowable, or was it of a character and to such
an extent that it infringed the complainant’s rights?” 87 The word
allowable here turns on whether the use was fair, for the defendantuser was arguing that his use was “allowable as fair quotations.” 88
Hence, the question the court posed was essentially: Was the use fair,
or was it of a character that it infringed the copyright holder’s rights?
This formulation suggests that fairness and infringement are mutually
exclusive, each representing the absence of the other. After
formulating the issue in this manner, the court observed: “Difficult
though it be to make proof, still the complainant is not entitled to any
decree, unless he proves infringement, as alleged, to the satisfaction
of the court, as the burden in that issue is always upon the party
making the charge.” 89 The fact that the court pointed out that the
burden of proving infringement lies with the copyright holder
immediately after suggesting that infringement is the absence of
fairness further suggests that the burden to prove infringement
consists of showing the absence of fairness. 90 Thus, the court’s
reference to fair use as the opposite of infringement and then its
84 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 1083, 1131 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“[B]ecause Folsom did not create a fair use defense
as such, but rather redefined the test of infringement, Folsom arguably would have required the
copyright holder to bear the burden of proof on the issue of harm as part of the burden to prove
infringement.”). But see John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law
Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 483 (2005) (“Under Folsom and its progeny, once the
copyright holder made a prima facie showing that the alleged infringer borrowed the protected
work, the burden then shifted to the alleged infringer to demonstrate that his use was
excusable.”).
85 Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 56, 60 (stating that the burden is on the charging party).
86 Id. at 60 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
87 Id. at 56.
88 Id. at 59.
89 Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
90 See id. (implying that such use is either fair or infringing on a copyright holder’s right,
and then placing the burden on the copyright holder to prove an infringement).
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immediate statement that the copyright holder always bears a burden
to prove infringement suggests that the Lawrence court viewed the
copyright holder as bearing a burden to prove that a use was not
fair. 91
Simms v. Stanton 92 is another early fair-use case that indicates that
copyright holders had a burden to prove that the use was unfair. 93
After opining that Justice Story best articulated the test for piracy, the
court acknowledged the uncertainty that surrounds some questions of
fair use. 94 The court then stated that although the copyright holder had
made a strong showing against the user, he had failed to satisfy his
burden of proof. In the court’s words:
While the respondent candidly admits that she consulted
complainant’s works in preparing and writing her own, and
while the excerpts or parallelisms tend to show that she
borrowed from complainant's books, and in several instances
certainly approached very closely to the line that marks the
boundary between a fair and an illegitimate use, still I think,
upon the whole of the case, that the complainant, on whom
the burden of proof lies, has failed to show such substantial
piracy on the part of respondent as would entitle him to relief
in a court of equity. 95
In no uncertain terms, the court ruled for the defendant-user on the
basis that the copyright holder had failed to satisfy his burden of
proving that the use was unfair.
91 A review of the pleadings of such early American cases does not shed light on which
litigant bore the burden of proof. The early fair-use cases in the United States all arose in
equitable proceedings, and to prevail in equity, a copyright holder must have pleaded that the
defendant’s act has caused harm. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.1(1), at 50 (2 ed. 1993) (“[E]quity would not grant a
remedy for a legal right unless, without the equitable remedy, the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable harm.”). So the fact that a copyright holder pleaded that a defendant’s use of the
copyrighted material caused harm by substituting for the copyright holder’s work does not
imply that as an action at law the copyright holder would bear a burden to make that showing in
order to prevail on a claim for infringement. See, e.g., Bill in Equity at 18–19, Lawrence v.
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (alleging harm caused by defendant’s use
of the copyright holder’s material to supersede copyright holder’s work). That said, language
that the copyright holder used in his bill in equity in Lawrence suggests that he needed to
demonstrate that the use was not fair according to the principles outlined in Folsom. See id. at
18 (alleging that defendant’s book “is and was intended to be a competing book with [the books
of the copyright holder] . . . [and intended] to supersede and take the place of said books”).
92 75 F. 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896).
93 See id. at 13 (holding that complainant failed to meet his burden of proof).
94 See id. at 9–10 (“Probably the most accurate, and at the same time concise, statement of
the test of piracy is that laid down by Mr. Circuit Justice Story . . . . What constitutes a ‘fair use’
is often a very difficult question to answer. What would be a ‘fair use’ in one case might not be
in another.”).
95 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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Additional language suggesting that copyright holders bear a
burden of proof on the issue of fair use arises in Greene v. Bishop. 96
There, the court noted that “[g]reat difficulties” surround the inquiry
into whether copying from an original author “amounts to piracy”, or
alternatively, whether the use “does not exceed what the law
permits.” 97 The court then explained that “if so much is taken that the
value of the original is sensibly and materially diminished, or the
labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent
appropriated by another . . . such taking or appropriation is sufficient
in point of law to maintain the suit.” 98 The court therefore framed the
infringement issue in terms of the use being unfair, and pointed out
that it is from that standpoint that the copyright holder maintains the
suit.
It seems clear, then, that the early cases indicate a burden on the
copyright holder to demonstrate an unfair use in order to show
infringement. But it is not immediately clear whether that burden
would give much advantage to users. It may be questioned whether a
burden of proof affects the fair-use analysis at all: today courts treat
the issue of fair use as a pure matter of law where the underlying
historical facts are undisputed. 99 As an issue of law that judges
usually decide at summary judgment, a litigant’s burden of proof
would not seem to affect how a court chooses to apply or not apply
fair use. But this was not always so. In years previous, fair use was
not an issue of law unaffected by any burden of proof; it was instead
an issue of fact subject to that burden. 100 Only in recent years have
some courts changed their treatment of fair use from issue of fact to
issue of law. 101 So in the past, when the issue of fairness was an issue
of fact, the burden was very relevant. 102 Moreover, some modern
10 F. Cas. 1128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763).
Id. at 1134.
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir.
1998) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the copyright holder on the
issue of fair use where no “genuine issues of material fact” existed); Snow, supra 19, at 539–42
(criticizing courts for treating issues of fair use as pure issues of law).
100 See Snow, supra 19, at 518–27 (arguing fair use was always a question of fact unless
the suit was in courts of equity).
101 See id. at 528–34 (noting the frequency of courts since 1980 disregarding the common
law concerns against deciding fair use issues on summary judgment).
102 See, e.g., Lillard v. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n, 87 F. 213, 213–14 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1898) (noting apparent impossibility for rights-holder to show market harm and thereby
concluding that use is fair); Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494, 497 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (analyzing
whether defendant’s use is fair and noting “the absence of testimony showing that plaintiff has
been, or is likely to be, injured by defendants' publication”). In Emerson v. Davis, 8 F. Cas. 615
(D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436), Justice Story examined whether a defendant had pirated the
copyright holder’s work in imitating that work. His opinion sheds light on the issue of burden of
proof:
96
97
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courts—although not all—still treat fair use as raising a factual issue
for the jury. 103 And it is possible that courts will yet recognize the
error in treating fair use as a pure matter of law.104
This history of courts treating fair use as definitional to
infringement, with a burden on the copyright holder to show an unfair
use, continued into the 1900s. Language from West Publishing Co. v.
Edward Thompson Co. 105 is illustrative:
If infringement and unfair use of such a [work] be shown, an
injunction would be the only appropriate remedy . . . .
....
The complainant has raised the question of unfair use; that is,
of infringement . . . .
....
In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been
done to an unfair extent. It is only after copying has been
shown that the question of fair or unfair use arises, and then it
is controlling. 106
The court thus viewed fair use as determining infringement, thereby
requiring the copyright holder to make a showing that the use was
unfair. 107 Similarly, the court in Solomon v. R. K. O. Radio Pictures,
Inc. 108 expressed the copyright holder’s burden: “[T]here was no

It is not sufficient to show, that [Defendant’s work] may have been suggested by [the
copyright holder’s work], or that some parts and pages of it have resemblances, in
method and details and illustrations, to [the copyright holder’s]. It must be further
shown, that the resemblances in those parts and pages are so close, so full, so
uniform, so striking, as fairly to lead to the conclusion that the one is a substantial
copy of the other, or mainly borrowed from it.
Id. at 622.
103 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 277–78 (6th
Cir. 2009) (finding that the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence); DC
Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four factors listed in
Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”).
104 See generally Snow, supra note 19 (arguing that courts should treat fair use as an issue
of fact).
105 169 F. 833 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
106 Id. at 844, 861 (emphasis added). The quoted language constitutes a statement of the
relevant law by the defendant’s lawyer, regarding “What Constitutes Infringement of
Copyright.” Id. at 861. The court characterized the quoted language as “a correct deduction of
the law.” Id. at 862.
107 See id. (noting that “the determination of the questions of fact raised by [fair use] will
substantially determine the [infringement] questions at issue”).
108 44 F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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substantial copying which would warrant a holding of unfair use or
actionable infringement. The plaintiff having failed to sustain the
burden of proof, judgment is rendered in favor of the defendants.” 109
Into the middle of the twentieth century, fair use determined whether
a copyright holder’s rights had been infringed, defining the scope of a
copyright holder’s rights. 110
B. Judicial Departure from Precedent
1. A Mistake by Two Commentators
Despite the fact that courts framed fair use as a doctrine that
defined copyright, one early commentator suggested that fair use was
a doctrine that excused infringement that had already occurred.111 In
his 1925 treatise on copyright, Richard DeWolf opined that fair use
exists because copyright holders tacitly consent to those uses. 112
DeWolf argued that the copyright holder’s creation of a work implied
his tacit consent to foreseen uses of the work, which meant that those
uses would be infringing without the tacit consent. 113 And, according
to DeWolf, copyright restricted even fair uses absent the tacit consent

109 Id. at 782; see also Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(discussing fair use as a doctrine of infringement, as distinct from the affirmative defenses that
the defendant pleaded).
110 Early fair-use cases often combined what today are the distinct doctrines of substantial
similarity, improper appropriation, and fair use. Treatment of any of these terms in an earlier
case suggests that courts viewed that treatment as applicable to all such doctrines. See, e.g.,
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946) (declaring an essential element of
copyright holder’s case to be establishing that defendant’s copying constitutes improper
appropriation, in contrast to permissible copying, and relying on Folsom to support a doctrine of
permissible copying, i.e., fair use); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir.
1946) (“[P]laintiff, to make out his case, must establish . . . that, if copying is proved, it . . .
constitute[s] unlawful appropriation.”).
Although cases did not always speak to a burden, they often indicated that fair use
determined whether the defendant had infringed a copyright, which implied that the copyright
holder had the burden because the general burden to show infringement rests with the copyright
holder. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(“[T]he defendant’s use was not the kind of use intended to be forbidden by the statute and does
not constitute an infringement.”); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817,
818 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (“I have come to the conclusion that in publishing the portion of the song
‘Poor Pauline’, there was no infringement, and that the publication was a ‘fair use’ and
permissible and not contrary to law.”).
111 See RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925) (arguing fair
use merely excuses a copyright infringement).
112 Id. (“‘[F]air use’ strictly speaking . . . is a use technically forbidden by the law, but
allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that the author must have foreseen it and
tacitly consented to it.”).
113 See id. (suggesting that the copyright holder anticipates a degree of copying prepublication).
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of copyright holders. 114 Under DeWolf’s conception, fair use does not
represent a right of speech that competes with the right of copyright;
rather, fair use represents a copyright holder’s tacit choice to forbear
the exercise of his rights. 115 In contrast to earlier fair-use decisions,
DeWolf’s conception of the fair-use doctrine did not define
infringement; it excused it.116
Tellingly, DeWolf did not cite any legal commentators or courts
for his conception of fair use. 117 And a search of relevant authority at
the time of DeWolf reveals little to no support for his conception of
the doctrine. Only one case could support DeWolf’s proposition that
fair use arises from tacit or implied consent of a copyright holder. 118
The court in Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co.
explained, in dicta, that unauthorized uses may be permissible based
on the “implied consent” of a copyright holder, which arises from the
customary practice of his trade. 119 The court further explained,
however, that society as a whole—through common consent—
compels copyright holders’ consent. 120 Thus, even Sampson does not
appear consistent with DeWolf’s conception that in the absence of
consent, fair users infringe. Rather, the Sampson court’s reference to
fair use by common consent suggests that in the absence of consent, a
114 See

id. (arguing that fair use was “technically forbidden by law”).
id. (claiming that a part of publication is an understanding others may appropriate
work in some instancing without prior approval).
116 See id. (describing fair use as technically forbidden, yet customary and acceptable).
117 Id.
118 See Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 540–41 (1st Cir.
1905) (raising a similar argument to DeWolf’s).
119 Id. The Sampson court considered whether a defendant who had published portions of
the copyright holder’s city directory made a fair use of that directory. Id. at 539. Although the
court found infringement, the court explained (in dicta) that under some circumstances a
subsequent publisher may use identical expression of an earlier publication based on the prior
publisher’s implied consent. Id. at 540–41. Prior publishers, according to the court, impliedly
consented to uses of their expression where the subsequent use advanced the subject of their
expression. Id. The court inferred that implied consent from the fact that all publishers gave
their common consent to such usage: customary practice dictated consent to build upon the
original expression. Id.
Sampson’s description of implied consent based on customary practice is dubitable. At
that time, several courts and at least one commentator expressly rejected the idea that fair use
arose from implied consent of a rights-holder through customary practice of a trade. See Walter
v. Steinkopff, (1892) 3 Ch. 489, 499 (rejecting defendant’s argument that custom of quotation
justified copying); Maxwell v. Somerton, (1874) 22 W.L.R. 313 at 314 (recognizing
infringement despite general customary practice of provincial papers); Wyatt v. Barnard, (1814)
35 Eng. Rep. 408, 408 (Ch.) (rejecting argument that usual practices among publishers could
control the law); E.J. MACGILLIVRAY, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE DOMINIONS OF THE CROWN, AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 102–03 (1902) (“Custom of Trade has been pleaded in defence of what was otherwise
clearly a piracy. . . . It is clear that no such customs can be admitted.”).
120 See Sampson, 140 F. at 541 (“[B]y the common consent . . . subsequent authors are
sometimes entitled, and indeed, required, to make use of what precedes them in the precise form
in which last exhibited . . . .”).
115 See
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rights-holder would hold no rights, so no one could infringe. 121
DeWolf’s conception of fair use does not appear to accurately portray
how courts of his time treated the doctrine. 122
Albeit mistaken, DeWolf’s interpretation of fair use—as a
technically infringing use that is based on the implied consent of a
rights-holder—found its way into a 1944 copyright treatise by a well
known commentator, Horace Ball.123 Relying on the only case that
had adopted DeWolf’s faulty characterization (in dicta), 124 Ball
proclaimed: “Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright.” 125
Like DeWolf, Ball described fair use as a privilege that arises from
the implied consent of a copyright holder: 126
Although the Copyright Law makes no provision for ‘fair
use’ of another’s work, the author’s consent to a reasonable
use of his copyrighted works has always been implied . . . .
As a doctrine that arises from the implied consent of copyright
holders, fair use—according to Ball—excuses, rather than defines,
infringing conduct. Only because the author impliedly consents does
the infringing conduct go unpunished; hence, Ball preached that
“[f]air use is technically an infringement of copyright.” 127
That Ball’s description is mistaken becomes evident when
examining the caselaw that he relied on for it—Lawrence v. Dana. 128
121 See id. at 544–45 (discussing the implied consent that a copyright holder gives to users
and its limitations).
122 DeWolf’s understanding of fair use was analogous to the affirmative defense of implied
consent in a real-property trespass case. Cf. Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 256
A.D.2d 131, 131 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that implied consent in an affirmative defense to
an action for real property trespass). By contrast, the way that the Sampson court conceived fair
use was analogous to the rights of an easement holder over a servient estate holder, where the
servient estate holder has received the estate subject to an existing fair-use easement. Cf.
Shooting Point, LLC v. Wescoat, 576 S.E.2d 497, 502 (Va. 2003) (“A party alleging that a
particular use of an easement is unreasonably burdensome has the burden of proving his
allegation.”).
123 See HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)
(“Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that
the appropriation is reasonable and customary.”).
124 See Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S. Pat. Q. 40, 42
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) (citing DeWolf’s claim that authors implicitly consent to all use that were
reasonably foreseeable at the time of production).
125 BALL, supra note 123, at 240.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 260 nn.1–2 (citing Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No.
8,136)). In addition to Lawrence v. Dana, Ball cited five other cases to support his definition of
fair use as a technical infringement predicated on the implied consent of the rights-holder. See
id. at 260 nn.2–3, 5. Of those five, only one supports his view, Shapiro, 26 U.S. Pat. Q. at 42,
where the court quoted DeWolf’s description of fair use in dicta. Three of the others do not, see
Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (finding that copyright does not protect
“common property” such as plotlines but protects literary elements added to the plotline); Story
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In Lawrence, the court repeatedly referred to fair use as a privilege.129
Ball appears to have seized upon that privilege language to describe
fair use as a sort of implied-consent privilege, 130 analogous to the
implied-consent privilege in real property law. 131 The Lawrence
court, however, attached a broader meaning to privilege than did
Ball. 132 According to the Lawrence court, the fair-use privilege arose
because a fair user created expression—not because the copyright
holder had consented to the use. 133 More precisely, the Lawrence
court explained that a general privilege protects creators of
expression, but copyright limits the privilege where the copied
expression substitutes for the original. That is, copyright limits the
general privilege of expression to its core, i.e., fair use. So Lawrence
represents copyright as an exception to the general privilege of
expression, and fair use as the core of that privilege which copyright
may not restrict. 134 Ball, on the other hand, employed the word

v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) (relying upon Folsom v.
Marsh to declare fair use is not an infringement if it does not supersede the purpose of or act as
a substitute for the original work); Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271–72
(Ch.) (relying upon plaintiff’s absence of damage to the plaintiff to deny preliminary
injunction), and, as discussed infra in this section, one is questionable, see Sampson & Murdock
Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 539–40 (1st Cir. 1905) (holding “it clearly was not the
implied intention” of the plaintiff to allow the defendant to copy portions of the plaintiff’s
directory).
Further evidence that the DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use was mistaken is apparent
from another commentator’s opinion at about the same time as Horace Ball. Professor Melville
Nimmer stated: “It is sometimes suggested that fair use is predicated on the implied or tacit
consent of the author. This is manifestly a fiction, for a restrictive legend on a work prohibiting
coping in whole or in part gives no greater protection than the copyright notice standing alone.”
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 13–157
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011) (footnotes and citations omitted).
129 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (describing
the “privilege conceded to subsequent authors”).
130 See BALL, supra note 123, at 260 (emphasis added) (“Fair use may be defined as a
privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent.”).
131 Cf. St. Louis Cnty. v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (emphases
added) (“[A] person who enters an area open to the public at a reasonable time and in a
reasonable manner, has the implied consent of the owner to enter the premises under a limited
privilege, and as long as the privilege, based upon implied consent, is within the conditional or
restricted consent of the owner to enter, the implied consent remains.”).
132 See Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 61 (referring to copyright law as limiting the “privilege of
fair use accorded to a subsequent writer”).
133 See id. (noting a book review is a fair use of the original work as long as the review
does not function as a substitute for the original work).
134 Early fair use jurisprudence reveals only three other cases where the court employed the
term “privilege” in describing the doctrine. See Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10–11 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1896) (quoting EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN THE GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 394 (1879))
(“She was, therefore, privileged to make a ‘fair use’ . . . . ‘The fair uses . . . which an author is
privileged to make of a copyrighted work . . . .’”); Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134
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privilege to suggest that fair use exists as an exception to the
otherwise superior right of copyright, where the exception is based on
a copyright holder’s implied consent to excuse infringing conduct.
This was not the meaning of privilege that the Lawrence court
articulated.
The DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use suggests that uncertainty
disfavors the application of fair use. Under their conception of fair
use as a technical infringement of copyright, fair use constitutes an
exception to a norm. And that characteristic of exceptionality
suggests that it should not apply unless warranted. So the norm
becomes copyright enforcement; the exception becomes fair use as an
excuse of infringement. Given that a proponent of an exception must
demonstrate that the exception should apply, fair users—under the
DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use—must demonstrate that fair use
applies. And uncertainty inhibits that demonstration. Subtle but
distinct, a new paradigm of fair use arose out of two commentators’
mistake.
2. Judicial Adoption of the Mistake
A consequence of this paradigm shift was that courts ceased
treating fair use as an element of infringement, instead treating it as
an affirmative defense. Once courts accepted the paradigm shift, the
change to affirmative defense was only natural: an affirmative
defense excuses a defendant from liability where the defendant’s
conduct would otherwise be infringing; if certain facts have occurred,
the affirmative defense excuses liability. 135 The DeWolf-Ball
conception of fair use as a doctrine that excuses infringement based
on the implied consent of copyright holders thus implicitly suggests

(C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763) (“[N]or can the privilege be so exercised as to supersede the
original [work].”); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497)
(“[T]his privilege can not be so exercised as to supersede the original [work].”). All are
consistent with the broad meaning that the court employed in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. at
61.
135 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1270, at 558 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining that an affirmative defense derives from the common
law plea of “confession and avoidance,” which permitted a defendant who was willing to admit
the plaintiff’s declaration of the prima facie case and then allege additional new material that
would defeat the plaintiff’s otherwise valid cause of action and excuse the defendant’s conduct);
see e.g., Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“The existence of an implied nonexclusive license . . . constitutes an affirmative defense to an
allegation of copyright infringement.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining affirmative defense as the “defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true,
will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are
true.”).
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that fair use is an affirmative defense, much like the affirmative
defense of consent in real property law. 136 One practical consequence
of treating fair use as an affirmative defense is that the fair user must
prove all facts necessary to prevail on the affirmative defense. 137
Unlike a defense, which does not require defendants to bear a burden
of proof, 138 an affirmative defense usually places the proof burden on
the defendant. 139 So prior to Ball, if a court ever referred to fair use as
a defense, the court was not suggesting that the burden of proof lie
with the defendant. 140 Courts that relied on Ball’s treatise, however,
treated fair use as a doctrine that excused infringing conduct, and so
they viewed it as an affirmative defense—one that placed the burden
of proof on the defendant. 141 They accordingly placed the burden of
proof on the fair user. Now bearing the burden of proof, fair users
faced a formidable challenge given the inherent uncertainty
surrounding whether any particular use is fair. Uncertainty now
favored copyright rather than fair use. Thus, as courts bought into the
DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use, they implicitly began treating fair
use as inferior to copyright. 142

136 Cf. Stukes v. Bachmeyer, 249 S.W.3d 461, 465 n.1 (Tex. App. 2007) (commenting in
real property action that a “defendant has the burden of proof to show consent or authorized use
and must plead consent as an affirmative defense”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 167
cmt. c (1965) (noting that party relying on possessor’s consent to entry upon real property bears
the burden of proving that fact).
137 See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The
burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense.”).
138 A defense is simply an asserted reason for which the plaintiff has no valid case. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1355, at 482 (referring to a doctrine as a defense does
not necessarily indicate that the defendant bears the burden of proof); see also, e.g., Duke v.
Duckworth, 236 F. App’x. 86, 88 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to qualified immunity as defense
and then specifying that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof once the defendant has pleaded it
in good faith); Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925,
928 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a defendant raises the defense of genericness in an infringement
case involving an unregistered mark, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that the mark
is valid and not generic.”); Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 101 n.6 (3d Cir.
2004) (“Once the defense has been raised, then the plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof
. . . .”); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defense which
demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”);
Cowen Co. v. Houck Mfg. Co., 249 F. 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1918) (“It sometimes happens that a
positive defense may properly be introduced under a general denial, in which case the burden of
proof is still upon the plaintiff . . . .”).
139 See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 629.
140 See, e.g., Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (referring to
fair use as a defense).
141 See, e.g., Loew’s Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 167, 174 (S.D.
Cal. 1955) (quoting from Ball’s treatise and referring to fair use as an affirmative defense), aff'd
sub nom., Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff’d sub nom. by an equally
divided court, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew’s, Inc. 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
142 See, e.g., id. and cases cited infra note 148 (noting courts that treated fair use as an
affirmative defense).
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Further history on fair use’s development into an affirmative
defense is revealing. The first court to label fair use as an affirmative
defense—a California district court—did so in 1955, a decade after
Ball published his treatise. 143 Tellingly, that first court quoted from
Ball’s treatise, characterizing fair use as “technically an infringement
of copyright.” 144 Two more courts labeled fair use an affirmative
defense during the 1960s, 145 and three during the 1970s. 146 All were
district courts, and none of those district courts—or for that matter
any court ever—provided any reasoned support or analysis for their
labeling fair use as an affirmative defense. They did not indicate that
they were breaking from the judicial practice of treating fair use as
definitional to infringement. Instead, they merely noted its availability
as an affirmative defense in passing when introducing the fair-use
argument. It was as though the courts did not realize that they were
departing from historical precedent. And likely they did not. All were
likely viewing fair use through the framework of Ball, most citing to
the very page of Ball’s treatise on which he described fair use as a
privilege excusing infringement. 147 Assuming that those courts
believed that Ball—a well-respected commentator—correctly stated
the law of fair use, they would not have realized that they were
departing from the original conception of fair use by labeling it an
affirmative defense. The judicial creation of fair use as an affirmative
defense was a natural consequence of Ball’s faulty characterization,
and as a result, that judicial creation appears to have been an
unintentional mistake.

143 See Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 167 (listing fair use as one of the affirmative defenses the
defendant set forth).
144 Id. at 174.
145 See Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339, 341 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
(listing fair use as one of the defendant’s affirmative defenses); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
146 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp.
351, 355 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (noting that the defendants raised the affirmative defense of fair use);
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(noting that “fair use has been recognized as a valid affirmative defense”); Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 730, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Ball and deeming fair use an
affirmative defense), rev’d, 551 F.2d 484, (2d Cir. 1977); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica
Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[T]he burden of establishing
fair use is on the defendant . . . .”).
147 See Meredith, 378 F. Supp. at 689 n.11 (relying on Ball’s treatise for its conception of
fair use); Rohauer, 379 F. Supp. at 732 (same); Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 174 (same).
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C. Congressional Intent as Speech Right
1. Legislative History Prior to the Copyright Act
After the first court (the 1955 California district court) labeled fair
use an affirmative defense—but before any other courts did—
Congress considered the issue of whether fair use was a presumptive
right or an affirmative defense. In 1967, a House Judiciary Committee
considered legislation that eventually became the 1976 Copyright
Act. 148 The 1967 House Report stated only the following sentence
regarding which litigant should bear the fair-use burden of proof:
“The committee believes that any special statutory provision placing
the burden of proving fair use on one side or the other would be
unfair and undesirable.” 149 The Committee thus considered it
undesirable for Congress to speak on the issue, suggesting that the
Committee saw no reason to alter the status quo.150 That fact is
significant because at the time of this statement in 1967, only the
California district court had labeled fair use an affirmative defense—
hardly sufficient to constitute a status quo.151 The Committee’s advice
to remain silent suggests that in 1967, the Committee did not
recognize any need to depart from the then-existent judicial practice
of presuming fair use by placing the burden with copyright holders.
Nine years after that 1967 Report, Congress enacted the 1976
Copyright Act. 152 By that time, the law surrounding the status of fair
use as a presumptive right and the burden-of-proof issue had become
unsettled. 153 So the Committee’s advice that Congress should remain
silent on the issue became obsolete by the time Congress acted. It was
therefore necessary for Congress to break its silence on the issue, and
so Congress did. Through several provisions of the Act, Congress
expressed a clear intent on the issue. 154

148 H.R.

REP. NO. 90–83 (1967).
at 37.
150 See id. (stating no statutory provision related to the fair-use burden of proof is
necessary).
151 See Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 167.
152 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1301 (2006)).
153 See cases cited supra notes 141, 145 and 146 (discussing courts treating fair use as an
affirmative defense).
154 See Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative, 54 J.
COPYRIGHT. SOC’Y 139, 139–40 (2007) (“[W]ith the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act the
right of fair use cannot be considered an affirmative defense—either logically or doctrinally.”).
149 Id.
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2. Language of the Copyright Act
The most apparent indication of congressional intent on the issue
appears in the Act’s fair-use provision, section 107. 155 Section 107
articulates the doctrine as the original fair-use jurisprudence portrays
it—a doctrine that defines infringement: 156 “[T]he fair use of a
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 157
Expressly, then, Congress rejected the DeWolf-Ball conception of fair
use as a doctrine that excused technically infringing uses.158 Fair use
cannot be “technically an infringement” 159 if it “is not an
infringement.” 160 Congress cast aside the DeWolf-Ball conception
that had caused courts to depart from the original conception of fair
use as a right.
The quoted language of the Act—“the fair use of a copyrighted
work . . . is not an infringement of copyright”—draws a distinct line
between fair and infringing uses. What is fair is not infringing, and
what is infringing is not fair. Under the Act, then, fair use is
definitional to infringement.161 To satisfy his burden to show
infringement, then, a copyright holder must satisfy the definition of
infringement—i.e., a use that is not fair.
Other provisions in the Copyright Act manifest congressional
intent to treat fair use as a right. Section 108 expressly refers to fair
155 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3
(11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (noting in dicta that “fair use should be considered an
affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined
in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright”).
156 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (“[F]air use
remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, in
which Justice Story’s summary [that he articulated in Folsom v. Marsh] is discernible”).
157 17 U.S.C. § 107. The full sentence of the quotation reads:

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
Id.
158 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (exploring and critiquing the DeWolf-Ball conception
of fair use).
159 See BALL, supra note 123, at 260 (“Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright
. . . .”).
160 17 U.S.C. § 107.
161 See PATRY, supra note 13, at 585 (describing language of fair use provision in
Copyright Act as “backward phrasing” in view of the fact that fair use is an affirmative
defense); David Nimmer, InacCSSibility, in BENJAMIN KAPLAN ET AL., AN UNHURRIED VIEW
OF COPYRIGHT REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) Nimmer–8 (Iris C.
Geik et al. eds., 2005) (“Congress defined the fair use of a copyrighted work to lie outside the
rights of the copyright owner . . . . [T]his [fair-use] limitation is every bit as integral as, for
example, are those section 106 grants.”).
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use as a right. 162 The purpose of that section is to limit the scope of
copyright as enforced against public libraries and archives that
reproduce non-commercial copies. 163 Within that section, Congress
stated: “Nothing in this section . . . in any way affects the right of fair
use as provided by section 107.” 164 Noteworthy is that Congress
employed the word “right” to describe fair use rather than
“affirmative defense.” 165 Also noteworthy is that Congress employed
the same word, “right,” to describe that which is held by a copyright
holder, without providing any indication that the meaning of right is
any different in any context. 166 As the same sort of right held by a
copyright holder, the fair-use right must compete with the copyright
right. So by describing fair use as a competing right, Congress
intimated its intent that fair use define the scope of the copyright
right, rather than excuse an infringement of the copyright right. 167
3. Organization of the Copyright Act
Congressional intent is further apparent when viewing the
Copyright Act as an entire code. The purpose of Chapter 1 is to define
the subject matter and scope of copyright. 168 Individual sections
within that chapter state the subject matter, the exclusive rights, and
limitations on those exclusive rights. 169 The sections within Chapter 1
thus serve to define the scope of rights by both setting forth the rights
and demarcating the limits of those rights. To that end, the sections
are integral to one other. Indeed, the section that lists copyright’s
exclusive rights, section 106, qualifies those rights by making them
“[s]ubject to” all sections within Chapter 1 which provide limitations
on the rights. 170 All sections within Chapter 1 serve to define the
scope of the copyright rights.
This structure implies that when Congress placed the fair-use
provision in section 107 of Chapter 1, Congress intended that the fair162 17

U.S.C. § 108.
id. (providing a section entitled “Limitations on exclusive rights: Reproduction by
libraries and archives”).
164 Id. (emphasis added).
165 See id. at (f)(4) (noting that fair use is a right).
166 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Copyright owner’, with respect to any one of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.”).
167 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 108 (noting that fair use is a right), with 17 U.S.C. § 101
(defining copyright owner as holding a right).
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“Chapter 1 Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright”).
169 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–18.
170 17 U.S.C. § 106; see Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of
Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 69 n.363 (1999) (arguing that the
Copyright Act can be interpreted as providing that fair use is a definitional element of
copyright’s scope based on “subject to” language of 17 U.S.C. § 106).
163 See
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use provision be an integral part of the rights of copyright holders.
Congress must have therefore intended that the fair-use provision
define the scope of a copyright holder’s rights. 171 That fair use defines
the scope of copyright implies that fair use defines infringement, for
the scope of copyright must be ascertained to determine infringement;
and by defining infringement, fair use requires the litigant charged
with demonstrating infringement—the copyright holder—to
demonstrate that the use is not fair. 172 The placement of the fair-use
provision in Chapter 1 suggests a presumption of fair use.
4. 1976 Legislative History
Legislative history also indicates congressional intent to place the
burden of proof with copyright holders. In a 1976 House Report, the
Judiciary Committee noted the “established legal principle” that a
“burden of proof should not be placed upon a litigant to establish
facts particularly within the knowledge of his adversary.” 173 This
principle is well recognized in the law: as stated by Wright and
Miller, the burden should lie with the party who “has superior access
to the evidence needed to prove the fact,” in the absence of a
substantive policy reason otherwise.174 In other words, where the
burden of production is easier for one of the parties to satisfy because
of that party’s unique access to evidence, the burden of proof should
lie with that party. 175
This principle suggests that the burden of proving fair use should
lie with the copyright holder rather than with the fair user. The
principle is less relevant for the first three statutory fair-use factors
171 See Nimmer, supra note 161, at Nimmer–8 (“Congress delineated the rights of
copyright owners in all of sections 106 through 121. . . . Attention blinkered on section 106 fails
to discern that [fair use] is every bit as integral as, for example, are those section 106 grants.”);
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1099 (2007) (inferring from the
fact that the Copyright Act sets forth fair use as a limitation on copyright that the Act “require[s]
the copyright owner to prove that the defendant’s use exceeded the bounds of fair use in order to
show infringement”).
172 Congress did not intend that all sections of Chapter 1 require copyright holders to bear
the burden of proving their application or non-application. In a 1976 House Report, the
Judiciary Committee acknowledged that “the burden of proof should not be placed upon a
litigant to establish facts particularly within the knowledge of his adversary.” H.R. REP. NO. 94–
1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695. Tellingly, evidence suggesting
the fairness or unfairness of a use is uniquely within the knowledge of the copyright holder. See
infra Part II.C.4 (explaining rights-holders possess superior access to evidence concerning the
fourth, and most crucial, factor taken into consideration in infringement cases).
173 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695
(emphasis added). The Committee noted this principle in the context of advising courts how to
apply the first-sale doctrine, as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 109. Id.
174 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 135, § 5122, at 399–403.
175 See id. (inferring the burden of proof should rest directly on the party with superior
access to the required evidence).
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because evidence is often undisputed relating to those factors. 176 But
the principle is highly relevant to the fourth factor—market impact—
which often weighs heavily in the fair-use analysis. 177 The copyright
holder encounters less difficulty producing evidence of market impact
than does a fair user. 178 The copyright holder has unique access to
evidence of a use’s effect on the value of, or potential market for, the
original work. 179 As the litigant who owns the work, the copyright
holder experiences the effects of the defendant’s use. Thus, the
copyright holder is in the best position to gain access to evidence
about the market impact of the defendant’s use, i.e., the fourth
factor. 180 The evidentiary principle that the Judiciary Committee
directed courts to apply in assigning burdens of proof in copyright
cases suggests that the copyright holder should bear the burden in the
context of fair use. 181 It suggests a presumption of fair use.
D. Judicial Departure from Congressional Intent
Nine years after Congress had spoken on the burden of proof, the
Supreme Court spoke on the issue.182 In Harper & Row Publishers,
176 See Snow, supra note 19, at 492–93 (explaining that historical facts, which give rise to
the inferences that determine the first three factors, are usually not disputed). With respect to the
first three fair-use factors, the burden of production is usually not difficult for either party to
satisfy. Specifically, the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
and the amount and substantiality of the copying all derive from evidence of the defendant’s use
and from evidence of the original work: evidence of the defendant’s use is not uniquely within a
defendant’s knowledge, for that evidence led the copyright holder to bring suit; likewise,
evidence of the original copyrighted work is not uniquely within either party’s knowledge. See
17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing the four factors to be taken into consideration in determining “fair
use”).
177 Supreme Court precedent establishes that the fourth factor weighs heavily in the fairuse analysis. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (internal quotations and
citation omitted) (“The fourth factor is the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.”);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–55 (1984) (relying almost
exclusively on fourth factor to determine that use is fair); see also Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use:
Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1800–01 (2010) (discussing
the relative inability for fair users to demonstrate the absence of market harm in fair-use
analysis).
178 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, § 13.05[A][4], at 13–198.7 (“[S]evere problems of
proof can attend evidence on the fourth factor . . . .”).
179 Cf. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1271, 1309 (2008) (“[D]efendants may lack access, at reasonable cost, to evidence relevant to
some of the fair use factors, and therefore would tend to lose if they bore the burden of proof.”).
180 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, at § 13.05[A][4] (noting comparative advantage of
copyright holder over defendant to gain information relating to the market-impact factor).
181 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695
(“[T]he burden of proof should not be placed upon a litigant to establish facts particularly within
the knowledge of his adversary.”).
182 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985)
(requiring a case-by-case analysis that precluded categorical presumptions of fairness, thus
placing the burden of proof on fair users).
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Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 183 the Court considered whether the fairuse doctrine protected the defendant-user who had published an
article revealing portions of President Ford’s memoirs before his
memoirs were released. 184 Relevant to the burden-of-proof discussion,
the defendant-user argued that uses of copyrighted material for news
purposes should be presumptively fair. 185 The Court rejected this
argument by explaining that each case requires case-by-case analysis,
which precludes categorical presumptions of fairness. 186
But the Court did not stop there. In the same sentence, the Court
declared fair use to be an affirmative defense, which would require its
proponent—the user—to prove its application. 187 In one sentence,
then, fair use became an affirmative defense. 188 Immediately
thereafter, all fair users were required to prove their fair use. And fair
use’s inherent ambiguity served to prosecute rather than protect fair
users. Through a single sentence, the Court stripped fair use of its
centuries-old status as a doctrine that represented the speech rights of
subsequent authors.
The Harper Court’s declaration that fair use constitutes an
affirmative defense is especially troubling because the Court
represented that this was Congress’s intent. 189 But as the above
section demonstrates, that is simply not true.190 Rather tellingly, the
only citation that the Court provided for its declaration that Congress
“structured the [fair-use] provision as an affirmative defense” was to
a page in a 1967 House Report—drafted nearly a decade before the
Copyright Act was enacted—that contained only one statement
regarding the burden of proof. 191 That statement was the following:
“any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving fair use
on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable.” 192
Certainly this does not mean that Congress intended fair use to be an
183 471

U.S. 539 (1985).
at 542.
185 Id. at 561.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See id. (“The drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create
presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative defense
requiring a case-by-case analysis.”).
189 Id. In addition to the cited sentence, the Court relied on one commentator, William
Patry, who pointed out that prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act, some courts had placed
the burden of proof on the defendant. See PATRY, supra note 13, at 585 (stating fair use was an
affirmative defense under the 1909 Copyright Act). For a discussion of these prior courts that
had placed the burden on defendants, see supra Part II.B.
190 See supra Part II.C (explaining the Judiciary Committee’s advocated evidentiary
principle suggested that copyright holders should bear the burden of proof in fair use cases).
191 Harper, 471 U.S. at 561 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90–83, at 37 (1967)).
192 H.R. REP. NO. 90–83, at 37 (1967).
184 Id.
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affirmative defense when it passed the Copyright Act. Conspicuously
absent from Harper, then, is any support for construing fair use as an
affirmative defense.
Why, then, did the Harper Court portray fair use as an affirmative
defense? The answer may lie in the framework through which the
Court viewed fair use—that of Horace Ball. The Court quoted Ball’s
definition of fair use—a technical infringement that is excused
because of the implied consent of a copyright holder. 193 As discussed
above, Ball’s framework suggests that fair use is an affirmative
defense rather than a right. 194 So Ball’s faulty definition appears to
have influenced the Harper Court’s conception of fair use, similar to
prior decisions where courts first began labeling fair use as an
affirmative defense.195 The Court’s conclusion that fair use is an
affirmative defense is thus not surprising: the conclusion inheres in
the very framework through which the Court was viewing fair use—
that of Ball.
The Harper Court’s terse declaration that fair use was an
affirmative defense soon settled the burden-of-proof issue. In 1992,
Congress amended the Copyright Act and in the legislative history of
that amendment, the Judiciary Committee relied on the Harper
Court’s declaration to pronounce that “fair use is an affirmative
defense,” such that “the burden of proving fair use is always on the
party asserting the defense.”196 Two years later, the Court in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 197 again tersely declared fair use
to be an affirmative defense, relying on its prior statement from
Harper and the cited 1992 legislative history. 198 As in Harper, the
1992 Judiciary Committee and the Campbell Court both failed to
provide any substantive analysis in labeling fair use an affirmative
defense. 199 Despite the historical underpinnings of the fair-use
doctrine and the language of the Copyright Act, courts could no
longer treat fair use as a right.

193 See Harper, 471 U.S. at 548–50 (relying on Ball to define fair use and stating that the
copying at issue “would constitute infringement unless excused as fair use” and that “the fair
use doctrine was predicated on the author’s implied consent”).
194 See supra Part II.B (indicating Ball’s characterization of fair use was a misconception).
195 See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial adoption of
Ball’s formulation of fair use).
196 H.R. REP. NO. 102–836, at 3 & n.3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2554
& n.3.
197 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
198 Id. at 590 & n.20.
199 Cf. PATRY, supra note 13, at 585 (describing in five sentences how fair use came to be
an affirmative defense, ultimately pointing to bald statements by the Supreme Court that lack
any reasoned analysis).
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III. THE PRESENT TREATMENT
Courts today presume infringement rather than fairness. Treating
fair use as an affirmative defense, courts require fair users to
demonstrate that their use should be protected. 200 There is neither
discussion nor analysis about whether fair use should be either a
presumptive right or an exceptional excuse—it is always the latter. 201
Compared to its past status as a right, fair use has weakened
significantly. This weakness is manifest in judicial reasoning that is
based on the DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use, in the failure of
courts to recognize the speech nature of fair use, and in the procedural
burden that fair users face to prove their non-infringement. Each of
these manifestations of weakness is illustrated below.
A. Judicial Reasoning Under the DeWolf-Ball Conception
As discussed above, the Copyright Act expressly rejects the
DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use as a technically infringing
right. 202 Yet courts continue to employ that conception, which has
given rise to judicial reasoning that would nearly always prevent any
fair uses. Consider Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh. 203
There, the defendant-user, Clean Flicks, purchased copies of movies,
edited the content by removing sex, nudity, profanity, and violence,
and then sold the edited copies to consumers. 204 Clean Flicks always
purchased an authorized copy for every edited copy that it sold.205
200 See, e.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that fair use is “a denial of copyright infringement” on grounds
that fair use is well established as an affirmative defense); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc.,
354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (“The burden of proof is on the copier
because fair use is an affirmative defense . . . .”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, § 12.11[F], at 12–
217 (footnote omitted) (“[A]s a matter of definition, the defendant bears the burden of proof as
to all affirmative defenses, which are discussed throughout this treatise. The affirmative defense
that is most distinctive to the copyright sphere is fair use . . . .”).
201 It appears that one commentator has noted the change. See Bohannan, supra note 8484,
at 1131–32 (noting that historically fair use was not construed as an affirmative defense). And
only one jurist has expressed discomfort with this treatment of fair use, Judge Stanley Birch. See
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (Birch, J.) (“I
believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than
merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of
copyright.”); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (Birch, J.)
(“Although the traditional approach is to view ‘fair use’ as an affirmative defense, this writer,
speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the
Copyright Act of 1976.”).
202 See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining fair use is not technically an infringement and thus
cannot be an infringing right).
203 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Col. 2006).
204 Id. at 1238.
205 Id.
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Arguing fair use at summary judgment, Clean Flicks did not
prevail. 206 Influential in the court’s analysis was the market-impact
factor. 207 The evidence showed that for every edited copy that Clean
Flicks distributed to a consumer, an authorized copy of the Studios’
movie was purchased on behalf of that consumer, suggesting that
Clean Flicks’s use resulted in a positive effect on the market for the
copyrighted material.208
The court disagreed. 209 It interpreted the evidence to infer that
Clean Flicks’ use did not strengthen the market for the copyrighted
movies. 210 The court based this interpretation on the mistaken
conception of fair use as articulated by Horace Ball—that fair use
represents a technically infringing use that is permissible because of
the copyright holder’s implied consent.211 From this definition, the
court reasoned that the Studios would never have impliedly consented
to Clean Flicks’ use: the Studios apparently desired that certain
persons not consume their movies (i.e., persons who found their
movies to be morally objectionable), and Clean Flicks’ use enabled
those persons to consume the movies. 212
Under the court’s reasoning, the additional consumers that Clean
Flicks introduced into the market for the Studios’ movies did not
actually have a positive effect on the market for the Studios’ movies.
For, according to the court, the Studios could determine which
consumers should be counted in assessing whether Clean Flicks
strengthened the market. 213 That is, the court’s reasoning suggests that
copyright holders define the relevant consumer pool, such that the
fourth factor will always militate against a finding of fair use. 214
Moreover, the court’s logic implies that any time a copyright holder
objects to a use, implied consent would automatically be disproven. 215
206 Id.

at 1243.
id. at 1241–42 (evaluating the market impact factor and stating that “[t]he primary
argument on the fair use defense is the fourth statutory factor”).
208 Id. at 1239.
209 See id. at 1242 (noting that Clean Flicks’s argument was “superficial” because it
“ignore[d] the intrinsic value of the right to control the content of the copyrighted work”).
210 Id.
211 See id. (noting that fair use “is predicated on a theory of an author’s implied consent”).
212 Id. (“[Fair use] is not applicable here because the infringing parties are exploiting a
market for movies that is different from what the Studios have released into and for an audience
the Studios have not sought to reach.”).
213 See id. (noting that the author’s implied consent was required and thus basing the
relevant market on the author’s intended market).
214 Id; see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, at § 13.05[A][4], 13–198.4–198.5 (noting that a
court could define the potential market in a way that would always militate against a finding of
fair use).
215 Cf. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging that producers of copyrighted work did not intend to enter market for use at
issue, but finding infringement based on fact that copyright law should “respect” the copyright
207 See
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It would be difficult, if not logically impossible, to prevail on a fairuse argument under the reasoning of the Clean Flicks court, which
followed Ball’s conception of fair use.
B. Failure to Recognize Speech
If courts treated fair use as a right of speech, they would favor
defendant-users whenever close calls arose, namely, when one of any
number of circumstances could tip the balance either way. 216 At a
minimum, close-call cases would never be decided summarily,
without a factual hearing, in favor of the speech suppressor—the
copyright holder. 217 Yet they are, and routinely so. 218
Consider Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 219 where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
preliminary injunction enjoining defendant-users from publishing a
book about the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial.220 The book was
entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat, and it mimicked the famous Dr.
Seuss story, The Cat in the Hat. 221 The Ninth Circuit framed the fairuse issue as whether the users’ “taking would be excused.” 222 The
court ultimately rejected the fair-use argument, despite the fact that
the use appeared to make fun of the original Dr. Seuss story (in
addition to making fun of the O.J. trial).223 Such ridicule suggests that

holder’s choice not to enter that market).
216 One might argue that copyrighted speech should be afforded the same speech protection
as fair-use speech. See Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 88 DENV. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 36–37) (on file with author) (concluding that the tension
between the Free Speech Clause and copyright is much greater than the tension between the
Free Speech Clause and fair use). In short, the threat that an erroneous finding of fairness poses
to the production of copyrighted material is much less than the threat that an erroneous finding
of infringement poses to the production of fair uses. See id.
217 See generally Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (placing
burden of proof on party seeking to suppress expression); Snow, supra note 177, at 1781 (noting
precedent in various speech contexts requires speech suppressor to satisfy burden to show that
speech is unprotected).
218 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding against fair use on summary judgment, yet admitting that “there are
numerous competing considerations which make this decision a difficult one”), aff’d, 150 F.3d
132 (2d Cir. 1998).
219 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
220 Id. at 1406.
221 Dr. Seuss Enters. Inc. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1561 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that the rhymes, the illustrations, and the book’s packaging all
mimicked the distinctive style of Dr. Seuss), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
222 Dr. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399.
223 See id. at 1403 (citation omitted) (“Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly
mimic Dr. Seuss’ characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridicule. . . . Katz and
Wrinn merely use the Cat’s stove-pipe hat, the narrator (“Dr.Juice”), and the title (The Cat NOT
in the Hat!) ‘to get attention’ or maybe even ‘to avoid the drudgery in working up something
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the use is a parody, which is usually protected as speech.224 But the
court was blind to this nature of the use, refusing to acknowledge the
humor and criticism that resulted from that use.225
Noteworthy in Dr. Seuss was the appellate court’s consideration of
the market-impact factor. 226 The court stated: “Since fair use is an
affirmative defense, [defendant-users] must bring forward favorable
evidence about relevant markets.” 227 And the users did, as best they
could, arguing that there would be no effect on the copyright holder’s
market because the content of the two books differed dramatically. 228
Yet the defendant-users could only conjecture about the effect, for
their book had not yet been published. Conjecture was insufficient.
The use was inexcusable for the court because the defendant-users
could not prove that no harm would result. 229 The court, then,
appeared to construe fair use as a doctrine excusing harmless
infringement—a doctrine analogous to an excused trespass in
property law. 230 The court could not have been construing fair use as
a doctrine of speech, for if it had, the uncertainty surrounding the
fourth factor should have favored the defendant-users.
C. Reliance on the Burden of Proof
Like the court in Dr. Seuss, other courts reject users’ fair-use
arguments because of uncertainty surrounding the market-impact
factor. 231 This fact shows not only that courts fail to treat fair use as a

fresh.’”).
224 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–82 (1994) (“Parody needs
to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s
(or collective victims’) imagination. . . . [P]arody can claim legitimacy for some appropriation
. . . .).
225 See Dr. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401 (“While [O.J.] Simpson is depicted 13 times in the
Cat’s distinctively scrunched and somewhat shabby red and white stove-pipe hat, the substance
and content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman
murders or the O.J. Simpson trial.”).
226 See id. at 1403 (quotations and citations omitted) (“The fourth fair use factor is the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See id. (citation omitted) (concluding that since the defendant-users failed to submit
evidence about relevant markets by “confining ‘themselves to uncontroverted submissions that
there was no likely effect on the market for the original,’” they were not entitled to fair use as an
affirmative defense).
230 See Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 639 F. Supp. 2d 358, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (setting
forth harm as an element that must be shown to prevail on a claim for trespass to chattel).
231 See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood (Infinity Broad. II), 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d
Cir. 1998) (finding the fourth factor to be “a very close question” but ultimately deciding that it
tipped toward the copyright holder’s favor because it “has demonstrated at least the potential for
interference [by the defendant-user] with its inclusion of listen lines as part of its advertising
package”).
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doctrine of speech (as in Dr. Seuss), it also shows that courts rely on
the procedural burden of proof as a means to reject fair use—a burden
that courts created without justification. That is, the tendency for
courts to infer infringement from uncertainty, which may surround
any of the factors, implies that they are relying on a presumption
against fair use. 232 And in view of the uncertain nature of fair use,
rebutting that presumption often poses a practical impossibility for
fair users.
An example of this reliance on the burden of proof arises in
Infinity Broadcasting Corporation v. Kirkwood.233 The defendant,
Kirkwood, broadcasted radio programs from different cities via the
telephone to its telephone customers. 234 The copyright holder,
Infinity, held the copyrights to the broadcasts. 235 On summary
judgment, the district court found Kirkwood’s use to be fair. 236 On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
use constituted infringement. 237
Central to the Second Circuit’s holding was the fourth factor of
market impact. 238 Although Kirkwood had produced evidence that
Infinity was not in the business of operating commercial telephone
lines, the Second Circuit was not persuaded that the fourth factor
favored Kirkwood. 239 The Second Circuit expressly pointed out that
Kirkwood had failed to prove that its use would not affect Infinity’s
potential to exploit that market. 240 Admitting that “the fourth factor is
a very close question,” the Second Circuit held for Infinity because,
“considering that Kirkwood bears the burden of showing an absence
of ‘usurpation’ harm to Infinity,” the fourth factor “tips toward
Infinity.” 241 Kirkwood’s burden of proof, which the court expressly
pointed out four times, proved to be dispositive in favor of the
copyright holder. 242 Thus, the burden of proof matters. It has
weakened the strength of fair use.

232 See generally Snow, supra note 177, at 1800–01 (describing effect of burden of proof in
judicial decisions with regard to the four-factor analysis).
233 Infinity Broad. II, 150 F.3d at 111.
234 Id. at 106.
235 Id. at 107.
236 Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood (Infinity I), 965 F. Supp. 553, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
237 Infinity Broad. II, 150 F.3d at 111–12.
238 See id. at 110–11 (citation omitted) (“Historically, the fourth factor has been seen as
central to the fair use analysis . . . .”).
239 Id. at 111.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 See id. at 109–12 (finding that the first, second, third, and fourth factors of the fair use
test leans in Infinity’s favor, rather than Kirkwood’s).

11/15/2011 4:54:22 PM

174

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

CONCLUSION
This Article has explained what fair use was, what it has become,
and the lack of reason for its change. Fair use once existed as doctrine
through which a right of speech was realized. As the means for
realizing a subsequent speaker’s right of speech, fair use defined the
scope of a copyright holder’s rights. It was inseparable from the
examination for copyright infringement, and as a result, a burden of
proof rested with the copyright holder to show that the use in question
was unfair. In short, fair use presumptively applied: fair-use speech
was permissible unless a copyright holder could prove that censorship
was appropriate.243 Courts treated fair use with as much weight as any
right of speech, both from a conceptual and procedural standpoint.
Courts today treat fair use as an excuse for infringing conduct.
Silence through copyright has become the norm; speech through fair
use has become the exception.244 As an exception, fair use applies
only in extraordinary circumstances. It presumptively does not apply:
the fair user must prove that his speech merits protection. 245 Courts
treat fair use with as much weight as any excuse for trespassory
conduct in property law—as exceptional and burdensome. 246
The change in the treatment of fair use occurred without any
reasoned support. Jurisprudence and scholarship are devoid of any
explanation of why fair use is now an affirmative defense.247 The
change from right to excuse happened subtly and mistakenly—tracing
back to two commentators’ misconception.248 In accepting this
misconception, courts re-framed the issue of fair use merely because
someone said so. 249 The change lacked any foundation in the law.
243 See

supra Part II.A.
supra Part III.
245 See supra Part II.B.
246 Compare Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The
general standard, however, is clear enough: the fair use copier must copy no more than is
reasonably necessary . . . . The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative
defense.”), and BALL, supra note 123, at 260 (“Fair use is technically an infringement of
copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is reasonable and
customary. . . . [T]he author’s consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works has always
been implied . . . .”), with St. Louis Cnty v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(“[A] person who enters an area open to the public at a reasonable time and in a reasonable
manner, has the implied consent of the owner to enter the premises under a limited privilege,
and as long as the privilege, based upon implied consent, is within the conditional or restricted
consent of the owner to enter, the implied consent remains.”), and 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 73
(2007) (“Consent sufficient to constitute a defense to trespass may be implied from custom,
usage, or conduct. . . . Consent, as an affirmative defense to a trespass claim, will be implied
. . . .”).
247 See supra Part II.B.
248 See supra Part II.B.
249 See supra Part II.B, D.
244 See
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